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Corporate Speech Under Fire:
Has Nike Finally Done It?
Victoria Dizik Teremenko*
I. INTRODUCTION
Picture the scenario of an in-house attorney for a large corporation,
"Big Shoe, Inc.," that produces athletic gear and sponsors athletic
events. This corporation is worldwide and its products are manufac-
tured in the United States, Indonesia, and Mexico. Big Shoe provides
athletic shoes for athletes like Michael Jordan and University of Mich-
igan football players. The corporation's CEO and a few directors will
be present at an upcoming press conference in Los Angeles and they
come to the attorney's office for a quick meeting before leaving for
the airport. Big Shoe has made headlines lately due to rumors of un-
safe, "sweatshop" factory conditions in Indonesia and Mexico. Al-
though the client has since denied the allegations, at the upcoming
press conference it may face more questions, more criticism. Big Shoe
has come to the attorney for advice about what issues it should discuss
and how it should answer questions regarding labor practices. The
directors of Big Shoe are shocked by the allegations and are sure they
are false. One of the directors has even prepared a public statement
he wants to make to the world letting everyone know that Big Shoe
does not condone "sweatshop" conditions of labor and instead, the
corporation promotes above minimum wage salaries, 40 hour working
weeks and has an age limit of 18 for applicants.
The attorney's decision is a difficult one: either advise the corpora-
tion to tell its side of the story and defend itself against rumors or
advise pure silence. Big Shoe's safest option is silence in order to
avoid any lawsuits. Although it may seem ridiculous to any attorney
and to the corporate officers, the threat of liability for false advertis-
ing, if the client accidentally makes a false or misleading statement, is
too great. Big Shoe's CEO and its directors should put away their
public statement and sit in silence while being questioned and criti-
cized by the media and Big Shoe consumers. Unless questioned about
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D., expected May 2004; Brandeis University, B.A.,
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a new line of shoes and their color, Big Shoe is better off remaining
quiet than acquiring liability for a slight mistake or a misstatement.
The general feeling in our society today is mistrust for corporations,
which began with the Enron controversy and has extended to tele-
communications corporations and other industry leaders. The public
has become more skeptical not only about the validity of business
practices of corporations as a whole, but also those of the officers and
directors. Courts have taken actions based on this mistrust, such as
ordering auditing of these corporations through the use of external
accounting firms. Recently the courts have even gone as far as cur-
tailing corporate speech.
This article will discuss the current status of corporate speech, its
diminishing protection and implications of societal mistrust on the fu-
ture of large corporations. Part II will define and discuss commercial
and noncommercial corporate speech in light of past Supreme Court
cases and a recent California Supreme Court decision, and will ana-
lyze commercial and noncommercial speech. Part III will argue that
corporate speech is more like noncommercial speech than commercial
speech. Based on that analysis, Part III will also provide guidelines
for practitioners of how to avoid liability if corporate speech receives
the lesser protection given to commercial speech. Part IV will present
the negative impact of allowing corporate speech lesser protection
than noncommercial speech.
II. BACKGROUND
The constitutional status of corporate speech hangs in limbo as a
result of the recent Supreme Court decision in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky.' In
Nike, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a California Su-
preme Court decision, which held that public statements made by Cal-
ifornia corporations, whether regarding products and services, or
issues of public concern, such as labor practices, are all considered
commercial speech and thus receive a lower level of First Amendment
protection.2 Based on Kasky v. Nike, Inc., corporate speech viewed as
a whole, regardless of its content, is entitled to the protection granted
to advertisements. 3 The Court granted certiorari to decide two
questions:
[first,] whether a corporation participating in a public debate may
be "subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that
its statements are 'commercial speech' because they might affect
1. 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
2. Id. at 2555 (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002)).
3. 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
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consumers' opinions about the business as good corporate citizen
and thereby affect their purchasing decisions"[; second,] even as-
suming the California Supreme Court properly characterized such
statements as commercial speech, whether the "First Amendment,
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, per-
mits subjecting speakers to the decision reached by the court
below. "4
The Court held that "(1) the judgment entered by the California Su-
preme Court was not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257;5
(2) neither party had standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court; and (3) the reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of
novel constitutional questions apply with special force in this case." 6
Therefore, the California Supreme Court corporate speech decision
stands unaffected.
The following sections will define corporate speech, noncommercial
speech and commercial speech, and will discuss the relevant cases in
an attempt to decipher this complex area of constitutional law.
A. Corporate Speech
Corporate speech, first recognized as its own entity in 1978,7 has
since grown and developed. Three cases, First National Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti,8 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion of California,9 and Kasky v. Nike10 define and explain how courts
have historically treated this form of expression.
1. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellottil1
Bellotti was the first case where the Supreme Court considered a
state statute that directly targeted and restricted corporate speech.12
The Supreme Court struck down a state law that prohibited corpora-
tions from making expenditures to influence elections other than
those "materially affecting any of the property, business, or assets of
the corporation."' 13 The Supreme Court rejected the idea that speech
4. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2555.
5. Id. The federal statute limits the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to "[f]inal judgments or de-
crees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a) (2003).
6. Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2555.
7. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
8. Id.
9. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Ca., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
10. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2003).
11. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
12. Id. at 767. Justice Powell, who delivered the opinion of the Court, noted that, "[tithe issue
presented in this context is one of first impression in this Court." Id.
13. Id. at 795 (citing MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (1977)).
2003]
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otherwise protected by the First Amendment lost that protection be-
cause of the speaker's corporate identity. 14
In Bellotti, national banking associations and business corporations
brought action to challenge the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
criminal statute prohibiting them from making contributions or ex-
penditures to influence the outcome of a vote on any question submit-
ted to voters other than questions materially affecting the business or
assets of the corporation. 15 The Supreme Court considered whether
the statute abridged the expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect. 16
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the appellant's
speech was "at the heart of First Amendment protection. 1 7 The
Court reasoned that the freedom of speech and press embraces the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully the matters of public concern
without restraint or fear of punishment.1 8 The Court held that the
14. Id. at 784. The Supreme Court held:
We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of
this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within that protec-
tion of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corpo-
ration that cannot prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business
or property.
Id.
15. 1d. at 765. The statute in question, referred to by the Court as § 8, provided as follows:
no corporation carrying on the business of a bank, trust, surety indemnity, safe deposit,
insurance.., no business corporation incorporated under the laws of or doing business
in the commonwealth ... shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or
promise to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the
purpose of aiding ... or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to
the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of
the corporation. No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of
the income, property or transactions of the individuals shall be deemed materially to
affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.
Id. at 767 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (1977)).
16. Id. at 771 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1269 (Mass.
1977)). The Supreme Court first reviewed the issue of:
whether business corporations, such as the appellants, have First Amendment rights
coexisting with those of natural persons ..... The court found its answer in the con-
tours of a corporation's constitutional right, as a 'person' under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not to be deprived of property without due process of law .... As an incident of
such protection, corporations also possess certain rights of speech and expression under
the First Amendment.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 771. (quoting Bellotti, 359 N.E.2d at 1269-70).
Thus, the California Supreme Court held, "only when a general political issue materially affects
a corporation's business property or assets may that corporation claim First Amendment protec-
tion for its speech or other activities entitling it to communicate its position on that issue to the
general public." Id. at 785 (quoting Bellotti, 359 N.E.2d at 1270).
17. Belotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
18. Id. Justice Powell wrote, "[flreedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
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referendum issue that the corporations wished to address fell within
that description because it would have affected the economy of the
state. 19 Justice Powell added, "[i]t is the type of speech indispensable
to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the
speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. '20
The Court next analogized the appellant's argument to "press
cases", such as Mills v. Alabama21 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Com-
pany,22 which emphasized "the special and constitutionally recognized
role of [the press] to [inform] and educat[e] the public, offering criti-
cism and proving a forum for discussion and debate. ' 23 The Court
held that similar to the press cases, the Court's decisions involving
corporations are based not only on the role of the First Amendment in
fostering individual self-expression, but also in affording public access
to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of ideas and
information. 24
In analyzing governmental interests in creating the Massachusetts
statute in question, the Supreme Court employed strict scrutiny analy-
SIS. 2 5 The Court held that the state may prevail only if it can show a
"subordinating interest which is compelling. ' 26 Even if the state can
show such an interest, it must employ means that are narrowly tai-
lored to "avoid unnecessary abridgment. ' 27 The first argument that
the State advanced was the state's interest in sustaining an active role
of the individual citizen in the electoral process and preventing the
decline of the citizen's confidence in the government.28 The Court
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Id. at 776 (quoting Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940)).
19. Id. The appellants wished to address the issue of the enactment of a graduated personal
income tax that they believed would have adverse effects of the economy of the State. Id. The
Court held that the importance of this referendum to the people of the state and its government
is not disputed, although its merits are subject to sharp disagreement. Id.
20. Id. at 777 (adding that, "[tihe inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, asso-
ciation, union or individual"). Id.
21. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
22. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
23. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781 (citing Mills, 384 U.S. at 219; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863-864).
24. Id. at 782 (citing Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-390 (1969); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)). Justice Powell added
that even those communications that based solely on the individual's right to express himself
may contribute to educating the public.
25. Id. at 786. The Court stated that the constitutionality of § 8 prohibition of corporate
speech "turns on whether it can survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed
restriction on the freedom of speech." Id.
26. Id. (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)).
27. Id. (quoting Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
28. Id. at 787.
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held that no matter how weighty these interests may seem in the con-
text of the elections, they are not served by the limitations on corpora-
tions enacted in the Massachusetts statute.29 The Court further stated
that there had been "no showing that the relative voice of corpora-
tions has been overwhelming, or even significant, in influencing [state
elections] or that there has been any threat to the confidences of the
citizen[s] in [the] government. '30 The Court added that the mere fact
that advocacy may influence the public is not a reason to suppress it.31
The State's second argument in sustaining the statute was to protect
the interests and rights of shareholders whose views differ from those
expressed by management on behalf of the corporation.32 The Court
responded that the statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive in
dealing with this concern. 33 The statute was held to be underinclusive
because while it prohibited expenditures with respect to a referen-
dum, it permitted activity with respect to defeating or passing legisla-
tion. 34 The statute did not prohibit corporations from expressing their
views though expenditure of corporate funds on a public issue until it
became the subject of a referendum.35 Also, the statute was underin-
clusive because it excluded those organizations or entities that may
hold an interest or membership and resources comparable to corpora-
tions, such as labor unions.36
29. Bellotti 435 U.S. at 787-8 n.26. The Court held:
In addition to prohibiting corporate contributions and expenditures for the purpose of
influencing the vote on a ballot question submitted to the voters, § 8 also proscribed
corporate contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of aiding, promoting or
preventing the nomination of election of any person to public office, or aiding, promot-
ing, or antagonizing the interests of any political party."
Id. (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (1977)). Although this statute is like many other
state and federal laws regulating corporate participation in partisan candidate elections due to
concerns of corruption of elected representatives, the issue in this case is different because it
concerns corporations' rights in a different context of participation, the right to speak on issues
of public interest. Id. at 788.
30. Id. at 790 n.28. The record from the 1972 referendum election shows that three of the
appellants each contributed $3,000 to the "opposition" committee.
31. Id. at 790. Powell added that the concept that the government may restrict speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the voice of others is inconsistent with the First
Amendment guarantees. Id. at 791 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-9).
32. Id. at 787. The state argued that the statute served this interest by "preventing the use of
corporate resources in furtherance of views with which some shareholders may disagree." Id. at
792-793.
33. Id. at 793.
34. Id.
35. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793. The Court claimed that either way corporate funds are spent on a
public issue, during a referendum or not, the displeasure of disapproving shareholders is not
likely to be different.
36. Id. The Court specifically pointed at exclusion under § 8 of such entities as business trusts,
labor unions, and real estate investment trusts.
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The statute was held to be overinclusive because it prohibited a cor-
poration from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal even if
its shareholders unanimously agreed to make such expenditures.37
The Court stated, that even assuming protection of shareholders is a
compelling state interest, it did not find a substantially relevant corre-
lation between the governmental interest asserted and the state's ac-
tion to prohibit the appellants from speaking.38 Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that because the Massachusetts statute was un-
justified by a compelling state interest, it must be invalidated. 39
2. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission4°
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the California Public Utilities Commission may require a privately
owned utility company, Pacific Gas & Electric Company ("Pacific
Gas"), to include in its billing envelopes speech of a third party with
which the private company disagreed.41
Before the litigation arose, Pacific Gas had been distributing a
newsletter with its monthly billing envelope for 62 years.42 The news-
letter, entitled Progress, reached over three million customers.43 It
included political editorials, featured stories on matters of public in-
terest, tips on energy conservation, and regular information about util-
ity services and bills.44
In 1980, Turn Utility Rate Normalization ("Turn"), an intervenor in
a ratemaking proceeding before California's Public Utility Commis-
sion, urged the Commission to prevent Pacific Gas from using the bill-
ing envelopes to distribute political editorials because Pacific Gas
customers should not "bear the expense of appellant's own political
speech. ' 45 The Commission decided that the envelope space that Pa-
37. Id. at 794. The Court held that acting through their power to elect the board of directors
or voting to enact protective provisions in the corporation's charter, shareholders are presumed
competent to protect their own interest. In addition, minority shareholders generally have ac-
cess to judicial remedies of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursement. Id.
38. Id. at 795 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)).
39. Id.
40. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Ca., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id. For example, the December 1984 issue of Progress included a story on Pacific Gas's
payment options, recipes for holiday dishes and a feature on the company's efforts to help bald
eagles in the Pit River area of California. The content of Progress also contained discussions
regarding merits of recently passed and pending legislation in Congress. Id.
45. Id.
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cific Gas used to distribute Progress was property of the- taxpayers.46
The Commission then permitted Turn to use that extra space four
times a year in the billing envelope to raise funds and communicate
with customers, and rejected Pacific Gas's objections that it owned the
extra space used by Turn.47
The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's findings based on
the theory of corporate speech, holding that a corporation has a First
Amendment right not to help spread a message with which it dis-
agrees.48 The majority reasoned that the constitutional guarantee of
free speech "serves significant societal interests" wholly apart from
the speaker's interest in self-expression. 49 By protecting those who
wish to enter the marketplace of ideas free from government attack,
the First Amendment protects the public interest in receiving informa-
tion. 50 The Court further held that the identity of the speaker is not
decisive in determining whether speech is protected. 51 Corporations
and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the "discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas" that the First
Amendment seeks to foster.5 2
The Court held that Progress was entitled to full protection of the
First Amendment because its speech extended beyond speech that
46. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 5. The Commission reasoned that envelope, postage costs, and
any other costs of mailing bills are a necessary part of providing utility services to the customer.
Id. However, due to the nature of postal rates, extra space existed in these billing envelopes. Id.
This extra space was generated by taxpayer funds and was not intended or necessary item of rate
base. Id. If the space was unused, it was reasoned to unjustly enrich Pacific Gas and deprive the
ratepayers of the value of that space. Therefore, the extra space in the envelope was deemed
ratepayer property (citing App. To Juris. Statement A-3). Id. at 6.
47. Id. at 6. The Commission reasoned that, "[olur goal... is to change the present system to
one that uses the space more efficiently for the ratepayers' benefit. It is reasonable to assume
that the ratepayer will benefit more from exposure to a variety of views than they will from only
that of PG & E." Id. (citing App. To Juris. Statement A-66, A 1-17).
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 8 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
50. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
51. Id. (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
52. Id. (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783). Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Brennan, and Justice O'Connor, added that:
Thus, in Bellotti, we invalidated a state prohibition aimed at speech by corporations
that sought to influence the outcome of a state referendum. Similarly, in Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980), we invalidated
a state order prohibiting a privately owned utility company from discussing controver-
sial political issues in its billing envelopes. In both cases, the critical considerations
were that the State sought to abridge speech that the First Amendment is designed to
protect, and that such a prohibitions limited the range of information and ideas to
which the public is exposed (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765; Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 533-535 (1980)).
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proposes a business transaction5 3 and included discussions of "matters
of public concern" that the First Amendment protects and
encourages.54
In considering the issue of compelling Pacific Gas to include Turn's
materials, the Court held that compelled access "both penalizes the
expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter
their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set."'5 5 The Court
added that corporations, as individuals, have a right to speak, and
within that right, a choice not to speak. 56 Speech does not lose its
protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker. 57
Lastly, the Court rejected Turn's argument that the Commission's
order was a permissible time, place and manner regulation since "it
serve[d] a significant governmental interest and [left] ample alterna-
tive channels for communication."58 For a time, place, or manner reg-
ulation to be valid it must be neutral as to the content of the speech to
be regulated. 59 The Court concluded that the Commission's order
burdened Pacific Gas's First Amendment rights because the order
forced it to associate with views of other speakers, and because it se-
lected those speakers on the basis of their viewpoints. 60 Thus, the or-
der was unconstitutional because it was not a narrowly tailored means
of furthering a compelling state interest and was not a valid time,
place, or manner regulation.61
53. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 5. Note that this statement by the Court serves the purpose of
fulfilling the definition of commercial speech. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985).
54. Id. at 9 (citing Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101).
55. Id. The Court added that these impermissible effects are not remedied by the Commis-
sion's definition of the relevant taxpayer property rights. Id.
56. Id. at 16 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)). Tornillo
involved a challenge to a Florida right of reply statute, which provided that if a newspaper at-
tacked a candidate's character, the candidate could demand that the newspaper print a reply of
equal prominence and space. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244-45. The Court held that the right of reply
statute violated the newspaper's right to speak in two ways: one, that it triggered an obligation to
permit other speakers with whom the newspaper disagreed to use its facilities to spread their
own message; and two, the statute deterred newspapers from speaking out because it forced the
newspapers to disseminate opponents views, and thus penalized their own expression.). Id.
57. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
58. Id. at 20 (citing Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 535).
59. Id. at 20 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). The
Court held that the State's asserted interest in exposing Pacific Gas's customers to a variety of
view points is not and does not assert to be a content neutral interest. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Court made the decision under strict scrutiny that for a state statute to be consti-
tutional, the government must assert a compelling state interest and the statute must be narrowly
tailored to further that compelling interest. A regulation of speech may be constitutional if it is
content neutral and merely restrains the time, place, and manner of the action and there are
alternative means of communication for the speaker.
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3. Nike Inc. v. Kasky62
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, the most recent corporate speech case in front
of the Supreme Court, left the doctrine in limbo based on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision.63 Nike, Inc., a marketer of athletic
shoes and sports apparel, has grown into a large multinational enter-
prise through a favorable brand image, a distinctive logo, sponsorship
agreements with celebrity athletes, and contracts for the manufacture
of its products in countries with low labor costs. 64 The majority of
Nike products are manufactured in China, Vietnam, Thailand, and In-
donesia; components involving more complex technology are manu-
factured in South Korea or Taiwan. 65
Nike has tried to promote the appearance and reality of good work-
ing conditions in Asian factories producing its products. 66 To assure
compliance, Nike employs accounting firms that conduct spot checks
of labor and environmental conditions.67 One such investigation was
conducted by Andrew Young, a former U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations that allegedly found no evidence of illegal or unsafe
working conditions at foreign Nike factories. 68
Nonetheless, Nike was heavily criticized between 1996 and 1997
when a series of reports surfaced regarding the working conditions in
its factories and were in sharp contrast with the report published by
Young.69 For instance, reports published by the Hong Kong Christian
Industrial Committee alleged that in three Chinese factories there
were violations of minimum wage laws, employment of children under
62. Nike, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
63. Id.
64. Kasky v. Nike, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 855-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 45 P.3d. 243 (Cal.
2002). In 1997, Nike reported annual revenues of $9.2 billion dollars, with annual expenditures
for advertising and marketing for almost $1 billion dollars. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
65. Kasky v. Nike, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856. The Appellate Court noted that the record indi-
cates that between 300,000 and 500,000 workers are employed in Asian factories producing Nike
products. Id. South Korean and Taiwanese companies that manufacture the products under
contract with Nike own Nike's actual production facilities. Id. Most of the workers who make
Nike products are women under the age of 24. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247.
66. Kasky v. Nike, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856. Since March 1993, all contractors and subcontrac-
tors working with Nike, Inc. are required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding that commits
them to comply with local laws regarding minimum wage, overtime, child labor, holidays and
vacations, insurance benefits, working conditions, and other similar matters and to retain records
documenting their compliance. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
67. Kasky v. Nike, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
68. Id. In 1997, Nike retained a consulting firm co-chaired by Andrew Young, a former am-
bassador to the United Nations, to carry out an independent evaluation of the labor practices in
Asian Nike factories. Id. After visiting twelve factories, Young issued a report that commented
favorably on working conditions in these facilities and found no evidence of abuse or mistreat-
ment of workers. Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 2:207
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16 years of age, had 11-12 hour work days, compulsory overtime, and
exposure to dangerous levels of dust and toxic fumes. 70 Such reports
put Nike under an unusual degree of public scrutiny as a company
"exemplifying a perceived a social evil associated with economic
globalization - the exploitation of young female workers in poor
countries. " 71
Nike responded by implementing a public relations campaign that
defended its labor practices and attempted to portray the corporation
as being in the front line of responsible corporations maintaining ade-
quate labor standards in foreign factories. 72 Press releases responded
to sweatshop allegations, addressed women's issues, stressed Nike's
code of conduct and denied exploitation of underage workers. 73 Nike
company officials wrote letters to the presidents and athletic directors
of those colleges sponsoring Nike products that defended the corpora-
tion's labor practices. 74 Nike also tried to rebut specific charges in
letters to editors of major newspapers and nonprofit organizations. 75
In Kasky, the plaintiff, Marc Kasky, an attorney, alleged that Nike
and several of its officers had committed actual fraud and deceit by
making misleading and untrue statements about its labor conditions
on behalf of the company.76 In addition, Kasky alleged that Nike
70. Id. Another accounting firm's spot audit of a large Vietnamese factory, which was leaked
to the press by a disgruntled employee, reported widespread violations of local regulations and
atmospheric pollution causing respiratory problems in 77 percent of the workers. Id. An investi-
gator for the Vietnam Labor Watch reported evidence of widespread abuse and a "pervasive
Isense of desperation' from 35 interviews with Vietnamese workers." Id. An Australian organi-
zation also published another highly critical evaluation of Nike's factories in Indonesia. Id.
71. Id. (citing Manning, Tracks Across the Globe - Nike 's Global Machine Goes on Trial, THE
OREGONIAN OF PORTLAND, Nov. 9, 1997, at Al (branding the Nike production system "an inter-
national human rights incident."). A North Carolina newspaper article asked, "But who wants
to enjoy products made on the backs of human misery"? Nike's Swoosh: A Symbol of Money
and Misery, THE NEWS AND RECORD OF GREENSBORO, Nov. 13, 1997, at A14. The New York
Times printed a series of eight articles between 1996 and 1997, reporting "grim conditions" and
widespread human rights abuses in Nike factories. Id. A CBS television report contrasted com-
plaints of a Vietnamese worker with disclaimers by Nike officials. Id.
72. Kasky, 93 Cal Rptr. 2d at 857.
73. Id. A lengthy press release entitled "Nike's Production Primer" answered a series of alle-
gations with detailed information and specific sources. Id. Another release highlighted the
favorable Young report and invited readers to consult on-line. Id.
74. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 302 (Cal. 2002). Nike said that workers who make Nike
products are protected from physical and sexual abuse, that they are paid in accordance with
applicable local laws and regulations governing wages and hours, that they are paid on average
double the applicable local minimum wage, that they receive a "living wage," that they receive
free meals and health care, and that their working conditions are in compliance with applicable
local laws and regulations governing occupational health and safety. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Kasky alleged that Nike and individual defendants, Philip Knight, Thomas Clarke,
Mark Parker, Stephen Gomez, and David Taylor, officers and/or directors of Nike, made false
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made a false claim that the Young report proves Nike is doing a good
job and "operating morally. '77
Kasky's complaint alleged four causes of action, all violating the
California Business and Professions Code, and the Unfair Competi-
tion Law.78 The first and second causes of action against Nike are
based on negligent misrepresentation and intentional and/or reckless
misrepresentation, in violation of the Business and Professions Code,
in order to maintain or increase its sales and profits.79 The third cause
of action alleged unfair business practices and the fourth alleged false
advertising, both also in violation of the Business and Professions
and misleading statements becausc of their negligence and carelessness, "with knowledge or
reckless disregard" of California laws prohibiting false and misleading statements. Id.
Kasky was able to bring suit because any person acting for the interests of the "general public"
may bring action for restitution or injunctive relief under the California's Unfair Competition
Law, Kasky was not required to allege any injury to himself. CAL. BUS. AND PROFESSIONS CODE
§ 17204 (2003). The California Business and Professions Codes § 17204 states:
Actions for any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court
of competent jurisdiction by the Attorney General or any district attorney or by any
county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions involving
violation of a county ordinance, or any city attorney of a city, or city and county, having
a population in excess of 750,000, and, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city
prosecutor in any city having a full-time city prosecutor or, with the consent of the
district attorney, by a city attorney in any city and county in the name of the people of
the State of California upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of any board,
officer, person, corporation or association or by any person acting for the interests of
itself, its members or the general public.
Id.
Kasky specifically alleged that in the course of this public relation campaign, Nike made a
series of six misinterpretations regarding its labor practices: (1) "that workers who make Nike
products are ...not subjected to corporal punishment and/or sexual abuse;" (2) "that Nike
products are made in accordance with applicable governmental laws and regulations governing
wages and hours;" (3) "that Nike products are made in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations governing health and safety conditions;" (4) "that Nike pays average line-workers
double the minimum wage in Southeastern Asia;" (5) "that workers who produce NIKE prod-
ucts receive free meals and health care;" and (6) "that Nike guarantees a 'living wage' for all
workers who make Nike products." Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
77. Kasky v. Nike, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
78. Id. The California Business and Professions Code defines "unfair competition" to include
any "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising and any act prohibited by the Chapter 1 (commencing with Section
17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE." CAL. Bus.
PROF. CODE § 17200 (2003).
79. Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857. The first and second causes of action, based on negligent
misrepresentation and intentional or reckless misrepresentation, alleged that Nike engaged in an
unlawful business practice in violation of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200
by making the above misrepresentations "[I]n order to maintain and/or increase its sales and
profits ... through its, advertising, promotional campaigns, public statements and marketing."
Id. (referring to CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 17200 (2003)).
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Code.80 The remedy Kasky sought was an injunction ordering Nike to
"disgorge all monies" that it acquired by the alleged unlawful and un-
fair practices, to undertake a court approved public information cam-
paign to correct the misinformation the public received via Nike's
false advertising, and to "cease [m]isrepresenting the working condi-
tions under which Nike products are made . . . ."81 In response, Nike
claimed that its speech was fully protected by the First Amendment,
and thus it could not be sued for fraud or misrepresentations.8 2
The California Supreme Court held that Nike's speech was not fully
protected because it is commercial speech, and thus the corporation
may be liable for its false speech. 83 The court first discussed noncom-
mercial and commercial speech under the United States Constitution,
80. Id. The third cause of action alleged unfair business practices within meaning of § 17200,
and the fourth cause of action alleged false advertising in violation of Business and Professions
Code section 17500. Section 17500 states that it is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or
association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or per-
sonal property or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature what-
soever or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or
disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, in any newspa-
per or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any
other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning that
real or personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, or concerning any circum-
stance or matter of fact connected with the proposed performance or disposition thereof, which
is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should
be known, to be untrue or misleading, or for any person, firm, or corporation to so make or
disseminate or cause to be so made or disseminated any such statement as part of a plan or
scheme with the intent not to sell that personal property or those services, professional or other-
wise, so advertised at the price stated therein, or as so advertised. Any violation of the provi-
sions of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or
by both that imprisonment and fine. CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 17500 (2003).
81. Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857; CAL. Bus.& PROFESSIONS CODE § 17535 (2003). Section
17535 states:
Any person, corporation, firm, partnership, joint stock company or any other associa-
tion or organization which violates or proposes to violate this chapter may be enjoined
by any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments.,
including the appointment of receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or em-
ployment by any person, corporation, partnership, joint stock company, or any other
association or organization of any practices which violates this chapter, or which may
be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or per-
sonal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice in this chapter declared
to be unlawful. Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by the
Attorney General or any district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, or city prose-
cutor in this state in the name of the people of the State of California upon their own
complaint or the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or
by any person acting for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public.
Id.
82. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 249 (Cal. 2002).
83. Id. at 247 (applying established principles of appellate review, the California Supreme
Court assumed in the opinion that the allegations asserted by the appellant, Kasky, were true).
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pointing out that noncommercial speech is entitled-to full First
Amendment protection, and that a content-based regulation is consti-
tutional only if it is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling govern-
ment interest.84 Commercial speech, on the other hand, the Court
reasoned, may be regulated if there is a "reasonable fit" between the
government's purpose and means chosen to achieve it.85
The court then discussed regulation of false or misleading speech.86
It stated that because there is no constitutional value in false state-
ments of fact, they may be regulated, and even banned. 87 However,
the court noted that some false or misleading speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection in the political arena to eliminate risk of
censorship. 88
After analyzing Supreme Court commercial speech decisions, the
California Supreme Court created a limited-purpose test to be used
for the purpose of deciding whether speech is commercial or noncom-
mercial. 89 Based on this test, it concluded that when a court must de-
cide whether particular speech may be subjected to laws aimed at
preventing false advertising or other forms of commercial deception,
in order to categorize a particular statement as commercial or non-
commercial, it must consider if: (1) the speaker is someone likely to be
engaged in commerce, (2) the intended audience is likely to be actual
or potential buyers or customers, or persons likely to repeat the mes-
sage or influence buyers or customers, and (3) the content of the mes-
84. Id. at 251 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)). A
content-based regulation can withstand strict scrutiny only if it is narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling government interest. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
For commercial speech to be regulated, as discussed in Central Hudson, the speech must concern
lawful activity and not to be misleading. Id. Next, the court must ask whether the asserted
government interest is substantial. Id. If both inquiries yield positive answers, then the court
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. The Supreme
Court clarified in State University v. Fox that the regulation should not be more extensive than
necessary- does not require the government to adopt the least restrictive means, but instead only
requires a "reasonable fit" between the government's purpose and means chosen to achieve it.
State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
86. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 251.
87. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)). In Dun & Bradstreet, Justice Powell stated that
when speech "concerns no public issue" and is "wholly false and clearly damaging," it "warrants
no special protection" under the First Amendment. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.
88. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 251 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
89. Id. at 256. In its analysis, the court stated that it created the test because neither the
Supreme Court nor the California Supreme Court has adopted an all-purpose test to distinguish
commercial from noncommercial speech under the First Amendment or the state constitution.
Id. at 255.
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sage is commercial in character. 90 If the three elements are present,
then the speech is commercial and thus receives a lower level of First
Amendment protection. 91
The court then proceeded to apply the limited purpose test to state-
ments in controversy made by Nike officials. 92 The court held that the
first element of the test, a commercial speaker, is satisfied because
Nike and its officers are engaged in commerce, as manufacturing and
selling athletic apparel.93 The court held that the second element of
the test, an intended commercial audience, is also satisfied because
Nike press releases and letters were addressed to college and univer-
sity athletic departments who are actual and potential buyers of Nike
products.94 The court then finally held that the third element, the con-
tent of the message being commercial in nature, is also met.95 The
court reasoned that in describing its own labor policies and labor con-
ditions in its Asian factories, Nike was making factual representations
of its own business operations, which were commercial in nature.96
The court reasoned that this information was in Nike's own knowl-
edge and it was in a position to readily verify the truth of any factual
assertions it made on these topics. 97
90. Id. at 252. The court then cited the Supreme Court decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where the Court held that commercial
speech may be prohibited because the truth of commercial speech is "more verifiable by its
disseminator," and because commercial speech is profit driven, it is less likely than noncommer-
cial speech to be chilled by government regulation. Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1975)). The Board of Pharmacy court rea-
soned that commercial speech consists of actual statements and that those statements describe
matters within the personal knowledge of the speaker and are made for the purpose of financial
gain. Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1975))
91. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 252.
92. Id. at 258.
93. Id. (holding that Nike and its officers are engaged in commerce because they manufacture,
import, distribute, and sell consumer goods, such as athletic shoes and apparel).
94. Id. Kasky also alleged that Nike's press releases and letters to newspaper editors, al-
though addressed to the public generally, were also intended to reach and influence actual and
potential buyers of Nike products. Id. Specifically, Kasky alleged that Nike made these state-
ments about its labor practices to maintain or increase its sales and profits. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Nike addressed matters within its own knowledge, i.e., discussing wages paid to fac-
tory employees, hours they worked, the way they were treated, and whether environmental con-
ditions under which they worked violated local health and safety laws. Id.
97. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002). To justify its decision, the court then
reasoned that when Nike made those statements to consumers, it engaged in speech that was
"hardy and durable." Id. The court stated that because Nike's purpose in making these state-
ments was to maintain its sales and profits, regulation aimed at preventing false and misleading
speech is unlikely to deter Nike from speaking truthfully or at all about labor conditions and
practices in its Asian factories. Id. Such a regulation may merely make Nike more cautious, and
cause it to make greater efforts to verify the truth of its statements. Id. The court added that
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Finally, the court reasoned that the government could regulate
speech about working conditions in factories where Nike products are
produced because the government has authority to regulate commer-
cial transactions for the protections of consumers to prevent false and
misleading commercial practices. 98 For the purposes of categorizing
Nike's speech as commercial or noncommercial, the court felt that it
did not matter that Nike was responding to charges publicly raised by
others and was thus participating in a public debate. 99 It held that
Nike's speech was not removed from the category of commercial
speech because it was intermingled with noncommercial speech.100
The court reasoned that although policy questions, such as the degree
to which domestic companies should be responsible for working con-
ditions in foreign factories, or what standards domestic companies
ought to observe in such factories, or the merits and effects of eco-
nomic globalization in general, are noncommercial speech,' 0 ' Nike
may not immunize itself from liability in making false or misleading
statements by making references to public issues. 0 2
such an incentive to verify information given to the public will serve the purpose of commercial
speech by "insuring that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely."
Id. (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772).
98. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 251. The court explained that trade regulation laws have traditionally
sought to suppress and prevent not only false or misleading statements about products or ser-
vices but also false and misleading statements regarding where certain products are made. Id.
(citing CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE § 17533.7 (2003), which makes it unlawful to sell a product falsely
labeled as "Made in U.S.A.").
99. Id. at 260. The court illustrates its point by citing to National Commission on Egg Nutrition
v. FTC, where a trade association denied there was scientific evidence that eating eggs increased
the risk of heart and circulatory disease. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d. 157
(7th Cir. (1977)). The Seventh Circuit held that these statements were commercial speech subject
to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission to the extent that these statements were false or
misleading. Id. The respondents argued that such statements were noncommercial because they
concerned a debate on a matter of great public interest. Id. The court responded that, "the right
of government to restrain false advertising can hardly depend upon the view of an agency or
court as to the relative importance of the issue to which false advertising relates." Id. at 163.
100. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260.
101. Id. (noting that regulation of noncommercial speech would require strict scrutiny).
102. The court also rejected Nike's argument that regulating its speech to suppress false and
misleading statements is impermissible because it disfavors Nike's point of view and favors the
view of Nike' s critics. Id. The court argued that the regulations in question do not suppress one
point of view, but merely suppress false and misleading speech. Id. Moreover, the court added
that differential treatment of speech based on the identity of the speaker is inherent, as was
articulated in Supreme Court decisions in commercial speech cases. Id. The court reasoned that
their decision in no way prohibits any business enterprise from speaking out on issues of public
importance or from vigorously defending its own labor practices. Id. It means only that when a
business enterprise, to promote and defend its sales and profits, makes a factual representation
about its own products or operations, it must speak truthfully. Id. The court added that it did
not consider this an intolerable burden to impose on the business community. Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this landmark case.' 0 3
In a per curiam decision, it dismissed the writ based on two jurisdic-
tional issues and in an effort to avoid premature adjudication of a
novel constitutional question.10 4 The Court held that the judgment
entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257; 105 neither party had standing to invoke
the jurisdiction of a federal court; and the reasons for avoiding prema-
ture adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special
force in this case.106
The first jurisdictional problem the Court analyzed was the fact that
California Supreme Court never entered a final judgment, a require-
ment for appellate review to be granted. 107 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that because an opinion on the merits in this case could take a
number of different paths, it is not clear whether reversal of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court would preclude any further litigation on the
relevant cause of action in the state proceedings to come.10 8 Also, it
was not clear to the Court whether reaching the merits of Nike's
103. Nike v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2555 (2003). The Court also emphasized that this lawsuit
is still at a preliminary stage, and that whether any false representations were made is an issue
that is yet to be resolved. Id.
104. Id.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 states,
(a) Fimal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or
where the validity of any state is drawn in question on the ground of its being repug-
nant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2003).
106. Id.
107. Congress has granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction with respect to state liti-
gation only after the highest state court in which judgment could be had renders a final judgment
or decree. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945). A literal interpretation of
the statute would preclude review whenever further proceedings remain to be determined in a
state court, "no matter how disassociated from the only federal issue" in the case. Id. In the
past the Court has rejected such a "mechanical" construction of the statute, and accepted juris-
diction in certain exceptional "situations in which the highest court of a State has finally deter-
mined the federal issue present in a particular case, but in which there are further proceedings in
the lower state courts to come." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975). In Cox,
the Court recognized that in many of such exceptional circumstances the "additional proceed-
ings anticipated in the lower state courts . . . would not require the decision of other federal
questions that might also require review by the Court at a later date." Id. Nike argued that this
case fits within the fourth category of those mentioned in Cox, where "the federal issue has been
finally decided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking
review" might prevail on nonfederal grounds, "reversal of the state court on the federal issue
would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action," and "refusal imme-
diately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy." Kasky, 123 S. Ct.
at 2556 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975)).
108. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975)).
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claims would serve the goal of judicial efficiency because if the Court
were to decide on the issues presented, it would have likely resulted in
a piecemeal review of the First Amendment issues at hand.10 9
The second reason why the Supreme Court felt that it lacked juris-
diction to hear Nike's claim was that neither party had standing to
invoke federal jurisdiction.110 Without alleging that Kasky has any
personal stake in the outcome of this case, he is proceeding as a pri-
vate attorney general seeking to enforce two California statutes on
behalf of the general public of the State of California.' He has not
asserted any federal claim; even if he had attempted to do so, he could
not invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court because he failed to al-
lege any injury to himself that is "distinct and palpable." 112 Thus,
Kasky does not have standing.11 3
The Supreme Court also held that Nike did not have standing be-
cause plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the
principles governing the federal courts. 114 Therefore the Supreme
Court may only exercise its jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgment
of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the
parties who petition for our review, where the requisites of a case or
controversy are also met.115 In this case, the requisites of a case or
controversy are not met."16
The third reason why the Court felt that it appropriately decided to
dismiss the writ of certiorari was based on the importance and diffi-
culty of the First Amendment issue raised in this case. 117 Due to the
109. Id.
110. Article III gives the federal courts jurisdiction over only "cases and controversies," and
the doctrine of standing to identify those disputes, which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial process. U.S. CONST. art. III.
111. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2557. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
112. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
113. The Court held that since federal rules of "justiciability" would have applied in state
courts, this suit would have been "dismissed at the outset." Id. at 2557 (citing Asarco, Inc. v.
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989)).
114. Nike, relying on Asarco, contended that it has standing to bring the case to this Court.
Kasky, 123 S.Ct. at 2557. In Asarco, a group of taxpayers brought a suit in state court seeking a
declaration that the State's law on mineral leases on state lands was invalid. Asarco, 490 U.S. at
611-12. After the Arizona Supreme Court granted plaintiffs a declaratory judgment holding that
the state law governing mineral leases is invalid, the defendants sought to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme Court held that the defendants had standing to invoke
the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the state proceedings had resulted in a final judgment
because the state court finally decided the federal issue. Id.
115. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2558 (citing Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1989)).
116. Id.
117. The Court quoted Justice Brandeis, who famously observed that the Court has devel-
oped, "for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules
under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed
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novelty and importance of the constitutional issues presented, the
Court did not want to anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.118 The Court reasoned that
this case presented a blending of commercial speech, noncommercial
speech, and debate on issues of public concern. 119 If the allegations of
intentional misstatements are true, the regulatory interest in protect-
ing the public may be high as there is no constitutional value in false
statements.1 20 But, such communications were part of an ongoing de-
bate that not only concerned Nike, but also labor practices by other
large corporations. 21 The Court felt that to correctly answer the is-
sues posed in this case there must be a study of the factual record
rather than a review of allegations posed by Kasky. 122
Justices Breyer and Kennedy dissented to the delay of the decision
by the Court and the delay in deciding this important constitutional
issue.123 They disagreed because the questions presented directly con-
cern the freedom of Americans to speak about public matters in pub-
lic debate, no jurisdictional rule prevented the Court from deciding
those questions now, and delay itself may inhibit the exercise of con-
stitutionally protected rights of free speech without making the issue
significantly easier to decide later on. 124 They argued that an action to
enforce California's laws that discourage certain kinds of speech
upon it for decision." Id. (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring
opinion)).
118. Id.
119. As the Court stated:
Further complicating the novel First Amendment issues in this case is the fact that Nike
seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the private attorney general provisions of
California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law. It apparently did not
raise this specific challenge below. Whether the scope of protection afforded to Nike's
speech should differ depending on whether the speech is challenged in a public or a
private enforcement action, it is a difficult and important question that the Court be-
lieved would benefit from further development in a lower court. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
120. The Court reasoned on the one hand, such regulatory interest was high because if the
communications contained misstatements, those direct communications with customers and po-
tential customers were intended to generate sales and possibly to maintain or enhance the mar-
ket value of Nike stocks. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2558.
121. The Court reasoned that on the other hand, knowledgeable persons should be free to
participate in such debate without fear of unfair reprisal. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2559. The interest in
protecting such participants from the chilling effect of the prospect of expensive litigation is
therefore also a matter of great importance. Id. (referring to Brief of Amici Curiae Exxon Mobil
et al. at 2; Brief of Amici Curiae Pfizer, Inc., at 11-12).
122. The Court added that the development of such a factual record may contribute in a
positive way to the public debate. Kasky, 123 S. Ct at 2558.
123. Id. at 2559. Justice Kennedy also dissented to the decision to dismiss the writ of certio-
rari as improvidently granted. Id.
124. Id. at 2560.
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amounts to more than just a genuine, future threat. 125 It is a present
reality, one that discourages Nike from engaging in speech. 126 It
thereby creates "injury in fact" and that injury is directly "traceable"
to Kasky's pursuit of this lawsuit. 127 And this Court's decision, if
favorable to Nike, can "redress" that injury. 128
B. Non-Commercial Speech
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech."'1 29
The framers commentary on freedom of speech focuses entirely on
the importance of free speech to self-government, the ability to criti-
cize government officials, and autonomy. 130 The framers also recog-
nized the importance of the freedom of speech and press to assure
that the American electorate receives a continuous flow of accurate
information about political candidates.1 31
Political speech, also referred to as noncommercial speech, has tra-
ditionally received fullest protection by the United States Constitu-
tion. 32 Therefore, content based regulations of political speech are
subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be nar-
rowly tailored and must promote a compelling government interest. 133
Content neutral regulations of political speech, such as laws regulating
the time, place, and manner of speech, are subject to intermediate
scrutiny, which considers (1) whether the regulation of speech is con-
tent-neutral, (2) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and (3) whether this regulation leaves
open an alternative channel of communication. 34 The following
cases, New York Times v. Sullivan, 35 and United States v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group, Inc.,136 illustrate the protection that noncommer-
cial speech has traditionally received.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2560.
128. Id.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
130. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 632 (1990) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), re-
ported in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 122 (P. Kurkland & R. Lerner eds. 1987)).
131. Id. (citing Report on the Virginia Resolution, Jan. 1800, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, 141, 145 (P. Kurkland & R. Lerner eds. 1987)).
132. Jonathan A. Loeb & Jeffrey A. Sklar, The California Supreme Court's New Test for Com-
mercial Speech, 25 L.A. LAW. 13 (2002) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
133. Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)).
134. Id. at 13 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
135. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
136. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
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1. New York Times Company v. Sullivan137
Noncommercial speech was discussed in New York Times v. Sulli-
van.138 The issue the Court considered was whether constitutional
protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award dam-
ages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his
official conduct. 139 In Sullivan, four African American clergy men
took out a full page advertisement in the New York Times on March
29, 1960 entitled 'Heed Their Rising Voices.' 140 The advertisement
spoke of African American students in the south, particularly Mont-
gomery, that have engaged in non-violent demonstrations in affirma-
tion of the right to live as guaranteed by the First Amendment, but
that had been arrested and had tear gas thrown at them by the po-
lice. 141 The advertisement also alleged that the police ringed the Ala-
bama State College Campus where these demonstrations took place
and padlocked the dining hall to starve the students into submis-
sion. 142 Sullivan, the then elected Commissioner of the City of Mont-
gomery, claimed that references to police referred to him because he
supervised the Police Department and made a written demand on the
New York Times to retract the advertisement. 143 The New York
Times refused. 144 Instead, the Times wrote him a letter questioning
why he thought the advertisement reflected on him.145 Sullivan filed a
libel suit a few days later.146
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 256. The Court stated that this was the first time such an issue was considered. Id.
140. Id. The advertisement further charged that in the students' efforts to uphold their right
to live in human dignity, as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, they are
being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would "deny and negate that docu-
ment which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modem freedom." Id. at 256.
141. Id. at 257. The text of the advertisement concluded with an appeal for funds for three
purposes: one, support of the student movement; two, the struggle for the right to vote; three,
legal defense of Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the movement, against perjury indictment that
was then pending in Montgomery. Id.
142. Id.
143. Sullivan and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or all of the
statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
144. Id. at 261.
145. Id. The response to Sullivan from the N.Y. Times stated that, "we are somewhat puzzled
as to how you think the statements in any way reflect on you," and "you might, if you desire, let
us know in what respect you claim that the statements in the advertisement reflect on you." Id.
The Times, however, subsequently published a retraction upon the demand of Governor Patter-
son of Alabama. ld.
146. Id. Alabama law at that time denied a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a
libel action brought on account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first
makes a written demand, for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. Id.
(citing ALA. CODE, TIT. 7, § 914 (1964)).
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The Court, in -its analysis, recognized that some of the statements in
the advertisement were not accurate descriptions of events that oc-
curred in Montgomery, but they still deserved First Amendment pro-
tection.147 The Supreme Court held that the publication at issue was
not a commercial advertisement because it communicated informa-
tion, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses,
and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose exis-
tence and objectives were matters of highest interest and concern. 148
The Court held that it could not place such a handicap upon the free-
dom of expression.1 49 If the allegedly libelous statement would other-
wise be constitutionally protected, they do not forfeit that protection
just because they were published in the form of a paid
advertisement. 150
The Court further discussed the general proposition that freedom of
expression regarding public issues is secured by the First Amend-
ment.1 51 The Court stated, "[t]he constitutional safeguard, we have
said, was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and societal changes desired by the peo-
ple."'1 52 The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discus-
sion is essential to democracy and the constitution.153 Thus, the Court
stated that it considered Sullivan "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
147. Id. at 263. The Alabama Supreme Court held that because the message at issue was
placed on a paid advertisement, it was commercial speech and thus is not protected. Id. The
Supreme Court reversed based on the doctrine of protection granted to noncommercial speech.
Id.
148. Id. at 266. The Court added that the fact that Times was paid for publishing the adver-
tisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold. Id.
Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying editorial advertisements of
this type, which would close an outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons
who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities but who wish to exercise their freedom
of speech. Id.
149. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
150. Id. at 266.
151. Id. at 269. The Court stated that, "[t]he general proposition that freedom of expression
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our deci-
sions." Id.
152. Id. at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484).
153. Id. (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369). The Stromberg Court held that,
"maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that the government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system." Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
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tacks on the government and public officials. ' 1 54 The advertisement
at issue was deemed an expression of grievance and protest on one of
the major public issues of that period of time, and thus qualified for
constitutional protection.155
The Court then considered the alleged falsity of the advertise-
ment. 156 The Court held that an erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate and that it must be protected if freedom of expression is to
have "breathing space" that it needs to survive.15 7
2. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.1 58
The doctrine of free speech was also discussed in United States v.
Playboy.159 This case presented a challenge to Section 505 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 that required cable operators who pro-
vide channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming
either to scramble sexually explicit channels, fully blocks those chan-
nels, or limit their transmission to hours when children were unlikely
to be viewing. 160 Playboy Entertainment Group challenged the stat-
ute as being unnecessarily restrictive and content based, violating the
First Amendment. 161
The Court held that although Playboy's programming consists of
sexually explicit material and such material is unwanted in homes with
children, the statute in question was content based and that speech is
defined by its content. 162 Thus, this statute could be upheld only if it
154. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. The Court added that the question is whether the advertise-
ment forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of Sullivan. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 271.
157. Id. at 272 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). The Court added that if
neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from
criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less adequate. Id. at 273.
158. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 806. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 505, 560, 561(a)(1994 ed., Supp.
III). The statutory time set for the scrambling was between 10 P.M. and 6 A.M. Even before
enactment of the statute, signal scrambling was already in use. Cable operators used scrambling
in the regular course of business, so that only paying customers had access to certain programs.
Scrambling, however, was not always precise and therefore, both audio and visual portions of the
programs might be seen or heard, a phenomenon known as "signal bleed." The purpose of § 505
was to shield children from hearing or seeing images resulting from the signal bleed. Playboy,
529 U.S. at 806.
161. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807.
162. Id. at 811. The Court held that the statute is content based because it applies only to
channels primarily dedicated to "sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that
is indecent." Id. The statute was unconcerned with signal bleed from any other channels. Id.
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satisfied strict scrutiny.163 Based on precedent, if a statute regulates
speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling state interest.164 If a less restrictive alternative that would
serve the government interest is available, the legislature must use
that alternative. 165 The Court generally held that if the purpose of a
content -based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listen-
ers, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails. 166
The Court held that "[w]e are expected to protect our own sensibili-
ties simply by averting [our] eyes."'1 67 Thus, if a viewer is offended, he
can merely avert his eyes. 168 Even though the government has an in-
terest in substituting itself for informed and empowered parents, its
interest is not sufficiently compelling to justify the widespread restric-
tion on speech.169 The Court further stated that even where speech is
indecent when it enters the home, the objective of shielding children
does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be ac-
complished by a less restrictive alternative. 170
The Court also recognized that only a fine line exists between
speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech that may be legiti-
mately regulated, suppressed, or punished. 17' Error in marking that
line exacts an extraordinary cost.172 The Court further argued that,
[i]t is through speech that our convictions and beliefs are influenced,
expressed, and tested. It is through speech that we bring those beliefs
to bear on government and on society. It is through speech that our
personalities are formed and expressed. The citizen is entitled to seek
out or reject certain ideas of influences without Government interfer-
ences or control.173
163. Id. at 813 (citing Sable Communications, Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that CDA's Internet inde-
cency provision burden on adult speech is unacceptable of less restrictive alternatives would be
at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve).
166. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
167. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (The Court added that it is not
suggesting that the government must be indifferent to unwanted, indecent speech that comes
into the home without parental consent. But the speech here is protected and the question is,
which standard the government must meet in order to restrict it.)).
168. Id.
169. Id. The Court recognized that cable television, like broadcast media, presents unique
problems that may justify restrictions that would be unacceptable in other contexts. Id. But, the
Court held that as they consider a content-based regulation, the standard is strict scrutiny. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 817 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
172. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817.
173. Id. The Court considered a philosophical argument that the Constitution exists precisely
so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature,
can be formed, tested, and expressed. Id. The Constitution says that these judgments are for the
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The Court concluded that if television broadcasts can expose children
to risk of exposure to indecent materials, even in their own homes and
without parental consent, there is a problem the government can ad-
dress. 174 But it must do so in a way consistent with the First Amend-
ment principles.1 75
C. Commercial Speech
The commercial speech doctrine is presently a controversial and
confusing subject. 176 The boundaries that separate commercial speech
from public discourse reflect sociological judgments about whether
particular forms of communication are valued merely as information
or as forms of democratic participation. 177 Commercial speech has
generally been defined as speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction. ' 178 The following cases, Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy et al., v. Virginia Citizens Consumer179 and Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.180 discuss this complicated subject..
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court reversed its longstanding
conclusion that the government, without any restraints, may regulate
purely commercial advertising.181 The Supreme Court also held that
commercial speech is not wholly outside the protection of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 182
individual to make, and not for the government, even with mandate or approval of the majority.
Id.
174. Id. at 826. The Court concluded that basic principles of speech were at stake in this case.
Id. It held, "when the purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its
content, special consideration or latitude is not accorded to the [G]overnment merely because
the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression." Id.
175. Id. at 827 (holding that here the government has not met the burden the First Amend-
ment imposes, the burden of satisfying the strict scrutiny analysis).
176. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1
(2000).
177. Id. at 1. In his article, Post explores how the Court makes judgments as to whether
speech is commercial in nature or is part of public discourse. Id. He discusses the distinction
between the constitutional function of commercial speech and noncommercial speech, argues
why the state may impose overbroad regulations, and establishes prior restraints within domain
of commercial speech, but not within the domain of public discourse. Id.
178. Id. at 3 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
179. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
180. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
181. Post, supra note 176, at 1 (citing State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). According to Post, this announcement generated the "commercial
speech" doctrine, a "notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurispru-
dence." Id. He argues that the Supreme Court, in striving to create a usable definition, has
sought to create a doctrine that "rests heavily on the commonsense distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction and other varieties of speech." Id. at 3 (citing Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
182. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
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1. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy et aL, v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer 83
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court analyzed whether the flow of drug
price information may be enjoyed by pharmacists and also by the pub-
lic receiving the information. 184 The Pharmacy Board claimed that
the Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising their
prices and discounts was unconstitutional.185
To analyze whether there is a First Amendment exception for com-
mercial speech, communication such as, "I will sell you the X prescrip-
tion drug at the Y price," the Supreme Court first defined what
commercial speech is not.186 First, the Court stated that speech does
not lose full protection because money is spent to protect it, as in a
paid advertisement in one form or another, because then all paid ad-
vertisements would be commercial speech.187 Second, the Court
stated that speech is fully protected even though it is carried in a form
that is sold for profit and even if it involves a solicitation to purchase,
because then books and newspapers would be commercial speech.188
Finally, the Court stated that it is not speech on a commercial subject,
or else business section editorials would be commercial speech; it isn't
even factual speech on a commercial subject or else business section
news reporting would be commercial speech.1 89
The Court then stated although an advertiser's interest may be
purely economic, that does not disqualify him from First Amendment
protection.1 90 The Court reasoned that society has a strong interest in
183. Id.
184. Id. at 756.
185. Id. at 749-750. The portion of the statute in question, VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35
(1974), provided that a pharmacist licensed in Virginia is guilty of unprofessional conduct if he
"(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any matter whatsoever, any
amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms... for any drugs which may be
dispensed only by prescription." Id.
186. Id. at 761. The Court began its analysis of the case as, "[olur pharmacist does not wish to
editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or litical. He does not wish to report any
particular newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters.
The 'idea' he wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I will sell you the X prescription drug at the
Y price.' Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of
the First Amendment." Id.
187. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964)).
188. Id. The Court reasoned that if speech is sold for profit or involves solicitation to
purchase was considered commercial speech, then most books and newspapers would consist of
commercial speech. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 762. The Court explained that the interests of the contestants in a labor dispute are
primarily economic, but it has long been settled that both the employer and employee are pro-
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the free flow of information.1 91 Even though an advertisement may
be entirely commercial, it may be of general public interest.1 92 It also
added that First Amendment interests in the free flow of information
could be found to outweigh the countervailing interests of the State.' 93
The Court also held that where a speaker exists, the protection is af-
forded to the communication, to its source, and to its recipients.1 94
Where there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to re-
ceive the advertising.1 95 Although the advertiser's interest is a purely
economic one, the Court held that it should not disqualify him from
First Amendment protection.1 96
The Supreme Court, however, added that commercial speech may
receive protection only if it concerns a lawful activity and is not mis-
leading.1 97 It reasoned that commercial speech may be regulated to
insure that the flow of information is truthful and legitimate commer-
cial information. 198 The Court reasoned that such regulation is consti-
tutional because the truth of commercial speech is easier to verify by
its disseminator than news reporting or political commentary, because
the advertiser himself knows more about his product than anyone
else. 199 Also, commercial speech is more durable than other kinds of
speech because of commercial profits.2°° Thus, there is less chance
that it will be chilled by government regulation and foregone
entirely. 201
tected by the First Amendment when they express themselves on the merits of the dispute to
influence the outcome. Id.
191. Id. at 764.
192. Id. (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertisements stated that referral
services for abortions were available); Fur Info.& Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son,
364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), (manufacturer of artificial furs promoted his product as an
alternative to the extinction by his competitors of fur-bearing animals)). Id.
193. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942),
rev'd, State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
194. Id. at 756 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (upholding the First
Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 761-763.
197. Id. at 771. The Court explained that untruthful speech, commercial or noncommercial,
has never been protected for its own sake. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974)). Much commercial speech is not provably false or wholly false, but only deceptive and/
or misleading. Id. The government is not prohibited from insuring that the stream of commer-
cial information can flow freely. Id.
198. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
199. Id. at 772.
200. Id. The Court distinguished commercial speech from noncommercial speech that the
Court had considered in cases such as Sullivan and Dun & Bradstreet. Id.
201. Id. The Court added that attributes such as these, the objectivity and hardiness of com-
mercial speech, make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the
speaker. Id.
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2. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.202
In Youngs Drug, a manufacturer and distributor of contraceptives
brought an action challenging a federal statute which prohibited unso-
licited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. 20 3 Youngs Drug pub-
licized the availability and desirability of its products by various
methods, such as fliers and pamphlets.20 4 In 1979 the Postal Service
brought allegations of unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertise-
ments against Youngs Drug and warned them that their mailings vio-
lated the federal statute at issue before the Court.20 5 Youngs Drug
then brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming
that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. 20 6
The Court held that the State's ban on such mailings violated the
First Amendment.20 7 The Court recognized that the Constitution ac-
cords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitution-
ally safeguarded forms of expression.20 8 But, the government has no
right to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content. 209 Content-based restrictions will be upheld
only in the most extraordinary situations. 210 But, regulation of com-
mercial speech based on content is less problematic based on the
greater potential for deception or confusion, as in the context of false
202. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
203. Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 61. The statute at issue, Tit. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) states that
"[any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or intended for prevent-
ing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail, and shall be
disposed of as the Postal Service directs." Id.
204. Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 62. In district court, Youngs Drug offered examples of its
informational pamphlets. The first, entitled "Condoms and Human Sexuality", was a 12-page
pamphlet that described the use, manufacture, desirability, and descriptions of various Trojan
brand condoms manufactured by Youngs Drug. Id. The second pamphlet, entitled "Plain Talk
About Venereal Disease," discussed at length the problems of this sexually transmitted disease,
the use, and advantages of condoms in preventing venereal disease. Id.
205. Id. at 63.
206. Id.
207. The Court held that all the mailings in the case are entitled to the "qualified but nonethe-
less substantial protection accorded to commercial speech." Id. at 68.
208. Id. at 65. The Court cited Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), where the Court first
extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech. Id. It further explained that the
"Court's decisions have recognized the 'commonsense' distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction that is subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech."
Id. at 64 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-456 (1978)).
209. Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 65 (citing Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
210. Id. The Court was referring to noncommercial speech, where in order to sustain a con-
tent based restriction, the regulation had to pass the test of strict scrutiny. Id. (referring to
Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 538-39 (1980).
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advertising.211 Thus, content-based restrictions on commercial speech
are permitted.21 2
An issue before the Court was first to determine whether the pro-
posed mailings were to be analyzed as commercial or noncommercial
speech.213 The Court realized that such mailings must be examined
carefully to ensure that speech deserving greater constitutional pro-
tection is not inadvertently suppressed.214 The Court first held that
the mere fact that the pamphlets were advertisements did not compel
the conclusion that they are commercial speech.215 Second, the Court
added that the reference to a specific product does not by itself render
the pamphlets commercial speech. 216 Third, the Court held that the
fact that Youngs Drug has an economic motivation for mailing pam-
phlets would be clearly insufficient by itself to turn the materials into
commercial speech. 217
The Court held that flyers consisting primarily of price and quantity
type information, or discussions of various brands of condoms and
specific recommendations, are properly characterized as commercial
speech.218 Therefore, the Court concluded that advertisers may enjoy
First Amendment protection but should not be permitted to gain im-
munity for false or misleading product information from government
regulation by including references to public issues.219 The protections
211. Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 65.
212. Id. The Court noted that their decisions have displayed a greater willingness to permit
content-based restrictions when the expression at issue fell in certain special and limited catego-
ries, such as libel (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)) fighting words
(citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). Id.
213. Id.
214. Youngs Drug contended that its proposed mailings constituted fully protected speech,
and thus § 3001(e)(2) was an impermissible content-based restriction on their expression. Id. at
66.
215. Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)).
216. Id. at 66 (citing Associated Students v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11, 24 (1973)).
217. Id. (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975)).
218. Id. at 67. The Court held that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as
commercial speech even though they contain discussions of important public issues, such as ve-
nereal disease and family planning. Id. at 68. The Court stated that it has made it clear in the
past that advertising linking product to current public debate is not entitled to First Amendment
protection given to noncommercial speech. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
219. Youngs Drug, 463 U.S. at 68. The Court further held that a company has full range of
protections available to its direct comments on public issues, so there is no reason for providing
similar constitutional protection when such statements are made in the context of commercial
transactions. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
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available for commercial expression depend on the expression and the
governmental interests served by the regulation.220
The Court also discussed whether the governmental interest in
prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements is
a substantial one.221 The fact that the protected speech may be offen-
sive to some does not justify its suppression.222 The Court held that
the statute is unconstitutional because it denied people truthful infor-
mation bearing on their ability to discuss birth control and to make
informed decisions in this area.22 3 Thus, the Court concluded that the
justifications offered by the Government were insufficient to warrant
the sweeping prohibition on mailing unsolicited contraceptive
advertisements. 224
III. ANALYSIS
A. Corporate Speech Analysis
Corporate speech that concerns issues of public debate is more like
noncommercial than commercial speech. Therefore, Nike's speech
was more like the noncommercial speech in the above listed cases and
thus should receive utmost First Amendment protection.
First, the Supreme Court in Bellotti and Pacific Gas concluded that
corporate speech deserved full protection under the First Amend-
ment.225 In Bellotti, the Court analyzed the corporate publication ref-
erendum issue as noncommercial speech because of its potential
effects on the economy of the state.226 Justice Powell added, "It is the
type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and
220. Id. at 69. In the case of contraceptive advertising, the Court held that it not only impli-
cated substantial individual and societal interests in the free flow of information, but also related
to activity that is protected from unwarranted state interference. Id.
221. Id. at 68. The Court reasoned that if the government interest is substantial, then it must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the asserted government interest, and
whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 69.
222. Id. at 71.
223. Id. The Court held that it declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech that would "render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition
of commercial speech." Id. at 72.
224. Id at 75. The Court reasoned that § 3001(e)(2) was defective for several reasons. One,
that the statute only provides limited support for the government interests asserted because it
may be assumed that parents already exercise substantial control over the disposition of the mail
once it enters the mailboxes. Id. at 73. Two, the statute is defective because it denies parents
truthful information bearing on their ability to discuss birth control and make informed decisions
about family planning. Id. at 74.
225. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Util's Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
226. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. The appellants wished to address the issue of the enactment of a
graduated personal income tax that they believed would have adverse effects of the economy of
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this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual. '227 In Nike, Nike's speech about its labor
practices can be analogized to First National Bank's speech concern-
ing electoral referendum because labor standards are as major public
issue as is the economy of the state.228 In Bellotti, the Court gave the
corporation's speech utmost protection because it concerned the
economy of the state, a major public issue.229 Thus, in Nike, Nike's
speech should be given utmost protection as well.
The Court next analogized the corporations' argument to "press
cases", such as Mills v. Alabama230 and Saxbe v. Washington Post
CO.,231 that emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role
of the press to inform and educate the public, offering criticism and
providing a forum for discussion.232 The Court held that similarly to
the press cases, the Court's decisions involving corporations are based
not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual
self-expression, but also in affording public access to discussion, de-
bate, and the dissemination of ideas and information. 233
Similar to Kasky, Nike's speech can be analogized to speech by the
media because it was informing and educating the public about for-
eign labor practices and standards. 234 By speaking, Nike was afford-
ing the public access to discussion and debate.235 Without such
speech, there would be no discussions about corporate practices
abroad.236
In Pacific Gas, the Court held that Progress was entitled to full pro-
tection of the First Amendment because its speech extended beyond
speech that merely proposed a business transaction and included dis-
cussion of matters of public concern that the First Amendment pro-
the State. Id. The Court held that the importance of this referendum to the people of the state
and its government is not disputed, although its merits are subject to sharp disagreement. Id.
227. Id. at 717. Justice Powell further added that, "[tihe inherent worth of the speech in terms
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union or individual." Id.
228. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 2554; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
229. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
230. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
231. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
232. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Saxbe v. Wash.
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)).
233. Id. at 782 (citing Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)). Justice Powell added
that even those communications that based solely on the individual's right to express himself
may contribute to educating the public. Id.
234. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2554.
235. See Id. at 2554.
236. Id. See also Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2559 (Breyer, J. & O'Connor, J. dissenting).
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tects and encourages. 237 Similarly in Kasky, Nike's speech went
beyond that of proposing a business transaction. 238 Its speech was not
to sell shoes or promote its name.239 Nike spoke to discuss its labor
practices in Asia and to defend itself from the criticism it had received
from various international human rights groups.240
The analysis the Supreme Court used in analyzing noncommercial
speech cases can also be applied to Kasky. In Sullivan, the Supreme
Court overturned the Alabama Supreme Court decision that held that
because a message was placed on a paid advertisement, it was deemed
commercial speech and thus was not protected.24' The Supreme
Court held that the New York Times advertisement was not commer-
cial speech because it communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial sup-
port on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives were
matters of highest interest and concern. 242 The Court reasoned that
placing a handicap upon an allegedly libelous statement that would
otherwise be protected was unconstitutional. 243 In Kasky, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court saw Nike's speech as advertising, and thus lack-
ing full First Amendment protection. 244 Similarly to Sullivan, in
Kasky the issue of labor practices is one of the major public issues of
its time, and Nike's speech was addressing it and thus should be given
utmost constitutional protection.
The Sullivan Court then considered the alleged falsity of the adver-
tisement.245 The Court held that an erroneous statement is inevitable
237. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 9 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 637 (1985)).
238. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.2d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002).
239. Id.
240. Id. Nike said that workers who make Nike products are protected from physical and
sexual abuse, that they are paid in accordance with applicable local laws and regulations gov-
erning wages and hours, that they are paid on average double the applicable local minimum
wage, that they receive a "living wage," that they receive free meals and health care, and that
their working conditions are in compliance with applicable local laws and regulations governing
occupational health and safety. Id.
241. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
242. Id. at 266. The Court added that the fact that Times paid for publishing the advertise-
ment is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold. Id.
Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying editorial advertisements of
this type, which would close an outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons
who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities but who wish to exercise their freedom
of speech. Id.
243. Id. at 266.
244. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 260. The California Supreme Court held that Nike's speech is not
removed from the category of commercial speech because it is intermingled with noncommercial
speech. Id.
245. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
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in free debate and that it must be protected if freedom of expression is
to have the "breathing space" that it needs to survive.2 46 In Kasky,
although Nike's speech may potentially be misleading, mistakes are
inevitable and in order to have an uninhibited free public debate, its
speech must be given "breathing space" that it needs. Otherwise,
without such protection corporate speech will not survive.
Nike's speech may be contrasted to the speech in Virginia Phar-
macy and Youngs Drug where the Court held that the companies'
speech was commercial speech and granted a lower level of protection
than it gave in noncommercial speech cases.247 In Virginia Pharmacy
the corporations sought to legalize the flow of drug price information
to be enjoyed by pharmacists and by the public.248 In Kasky, on the
other hand, Nike is not litigating to have permission to market its
prices and discounts. Nike's speech about labor practices goes beyond
that of merely advertising prices and discounts. Nike's speech in-
volves an area of major public concern and nowhere in its public cam-
paign does it talk about its prices and discounts typical to commercial
speech.
In Youngs Drug, a manufacturer and distributor of contraceptives
brought action challenging a federal statute prohibiting unsolicited
mailing of contraceptive advertisements. 249 The manufacturer publi-
cized the availability and desirability of its products by various meth-
ods, such as flyers and pamphlets.250 In the pamphlets Youngs Drug
expressly discussed different types of product's quality and prices.251
The Court correctly analyzed the manufacturer's speech as commer-
cial because the purpose of the flyers was to inform the public in order
to promote a transaction. 252 In Kasky on the other hand, Nike's
speech goes beyond that of discussing its products and promoting the
sales of its products. The purpose of its speech was to inform the pub-
246. Id. at 272 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
247. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1975); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
248. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 750.
249. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983). The statute at issue,
§ 3001(e)(2) stated that "[any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted,
or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by
mail, and shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs" Id.
250. Id. at 62.
251. In the district court, Youngs Drug offered examples of its informational pamphlets. Id.
The first, entitled "Condoms and Human Sexuality," was a 12-page pamphlet that described the
use, manufacture, desirability, and descriptions of various Trojan brand condoms manufactured
by Youngs Drug. Id. The second pamphlet, entitled "Plain Talk About Venereal Disease," dis-
cussed at length the problems of this sexually transmitted disease, the use and advantages of
condoms in preventing venereal disease. Id.
252. Id. at 69.
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lic about its labor practices, and that went beyond the purpose of try-
ing to sell shoes.253
B. Practitioner Guidelines
Corporate speech that concerns matters of public concern and de-
bate should be given the same protection as noncommercial speech.
However, given that the Supreme Court did not grant corporate
speech that protection, there are certain guidelines that practitioners
should follow to keep their corporate clients litigation free.
First, and the most obvious piece of advice, when a corporate officer
is speaking about the corporation, make sure he tells the truth. If
there is a fact that he is unsure of, advise him to say that he does not
know even if he is 75% sure. Unless there is guarantee that a certain
statement is 100% accurate, he may be putting his company at liability
for a false advertising suit.
Second, avoid making a controversial statement or statement based
on a study, such as concerning health effects of a product, unless re-
quired to do so by the industry. The effects of making such a state-
ment can be demonstrated by National Commission on Egg Nutrition
v. Federal Trade Commission.254 In this case, the Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC"), acting pursuant to its power to prohibit false and
misleading advertising, entered an order directing the National Com-
mission on Egg Nutrition ("NCEN") to stop disseminating advertise-
ments containing statements to the effect that there is no scientific
evidence that eating eggs increases the risk of heart and circulatory
disease. 255 To achieve this goal, NCEN began an advertising and pub-
lic relations campaign to convey the message that eggs are harmless
and beneficial for human nutrition.2 56 The FTC asked for an injunc-
tion and filed a complaint charging the NCEN with having violated
the FTC Act by placing false and misleading newspaper advertise-
ments.257 The NCEN claimed that the statements it made were true,
253. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 248 (Cal. 2000).
254. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d. 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
255. NCEN, a trade association, was formed by members of the egg industry to counteract
anti-cholesterol attacks on eggs that resulted in declining per capita egg consumption. Id. at 158.
The FTC also prohibited making statements similar to the statement described above and the
right to make other statements conditional by the order. Id.
256. Id. NCEN acted through placing advertisements containing statements with respect to
the relationship between eating eggs and heart and circulatory disease that the FTC claimed
were false and misleading. Id.
257. Id. (FTC brought suit under §§ 5, 12 of the FTC Act, 15 U. .S.C. 45, 52 (1983)).
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but even if they were misleading, the FTC's order infringes upon its
First Amendment rights.258
The evidence that the FTC used in arguing that NCEN's statements
were based on a diet/heart disease hypothesis that was a result of a
large body of clinical-pathological, experimental and epidemiological
studies.259 The NCEN did not challenge these studies, rather it relied
upon the testimony of its own expert witnesses that some scientists
and doctors did not agree with and claimed that their opinions are not
direct evidence that the number of eggs consumed does not increase
the risk of heart disease. 260 The Court held that, "NCEN has done
more than espouse one side of a genuine controversy... It has made
statements denying the existence of scientific evidence[,] which the re-
cord clearly shows does exist. These statements are, therefore, false
and misleading. '261
The lesson to be learned from the NCEN's mistake is that unless a
substantial number of studies exist that have been subject to sufficient
publication and peer review, an attorney should advise his corporate
client to not make statements based on unsubstantiated studies to
avoid false advertising suits. Agencies and corporations, especially
those that are food producers and or manufacturers, are safer relying
on government-accepted studies when advertising to avoid liability.
Third, information that directly pertains to the company's product
or rate structure can be freely advertised (as long as accurate). A
good example of this suggestion is Central Hudson Gas & Electric
258. Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d. at 160.
259. Id. at 160. The administrative law judge, after describing these studies, added that they
were conducted using scientific methodologies, were performed by competent and highly re-
garded investigators, have been reported in recognized scientific journals after peer review, and
have been generally accepted by experts in the field and by the scientific community. Id.
260. Id. at 161.
261. Id. In response to the First Amendment argument, the court held that advertising that is
false, deceptive, or misleading is subject to restraint. Id. at 162 (adding that since the advertiser
knows his product and has commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that
regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech). The Court argued that the
public and private benefits from commercial speech are based on confidence in its accuracy and
reliability. Id. (adding that leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been allowed
in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena). NCEN argued that its speech is not
commercial speech because it does more than merely propose a commercial transaction because
it contains expression of opinion on an important and controversial public issue. Id. Thus
NCEN claimed that its speech was like the paid advertisements in New York Times v. Sullivan.
In response, the Court held that the NCEN's statements were not phrased as statements of
opinion, but rather denied existence of evidence to induce people to buy eggs. Id at 163. The
Court further held that the nature of the communication does not change when a group of sellers
joins in advertising their common product. Id.
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Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York. 262 In Central
Hudson, an electric utility corporation brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of a New York regulation that banned the promo-
tional advertising of its services and rates.263
The Court held that the government may regulate advertising that is
false or misleading, but if the communication is neither of these two,
the government action is circumscribed.2 64 The government regula-
tory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves and
cannot completely suppress information when narrower restrictions
on expression would serve its interests as well. 265 The Court con-
cluded that Central Hudson's promotional advertising constituted
protected speech that was valuable to consumers who must decide
whether to use the monopoly service or turn to an alternative energy
source, and how much of it to purchase.2 66
Based on Central Hudson, corporations are free to advertise com-
peting products and even promote their own product over another.
This may not be taken as far as saying that one product is better than
the competitors without substantial and government accepted studies
262. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
263. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560. The Commission ordered electric utility companies to
cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity. Id. Its order was based on findings
that New York State did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to furnish all cus-
tomer demands for the 1973-1974 winter. Id. Three years later when the fuel shortage eased,
the Commission wanted to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Id. Central Hudson
opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. Id. The Court developed a test, the Central
Hudson test, to determine whether restrictions on commercial speech violate the First Amend-
ment. Id. The first element of the test is to determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. Id. at 561. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it must at
least concern a lawful activity and not be misleading. Id. Next, one must ask whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial. Id. If both inquiries yield positive answers, then one
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id.
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. Id. Com-
mercial speech not only serves the economic interest of the speaker but also assists consumers
and furthers the societal interests to disseminate information. Id. The Court in the past had
rejected a paternalistic view that allowed government to suppress or regulate commercial
speech. Id. The Court has held that people will perceive their own best interests only if they are
well informed, and the best means to achieve that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them. Id. Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version
of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better
than no information at all. Id. at 562 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374
(1977)).
264. Id. at 564.
265. Id. at 565 (holding that the State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the
asserted state interest).
266. Id. at 585.
CORPORATE SPEECH
to avoid suits for false advertising. So a practitioner may advise his
client to promote his company's product freely.
Fourth, information that pertains to the company's policies or prod-
uct labeling information may be freely advertised based on Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Company.267 In Coors Brewing, a brewer brought a
First Amendment action seeking an injunction against a subsection of
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA) that prohibited beer
labels from displaying alcohol content. 268 Coors Brewing Company
(Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) for approval of proposed labels and advertisements that dis-
closed alcohol content of its beer.269 BATF rejected the application
based on the Federal Alcohol Administration Act that prohibited dis-
closure of the alcohol content of beer on labels or in advertising. 270
Coors argued that there were less restrictive alternatives available
that would be less intrusive on its First Amendment rights.271 Coors
also argued that it only wanted to disclose truthful, verifiable, and
non-misleading factual information about the alcohol content.272 The
Court noted that although the First Amendment does not protect all
commercial speech, the free flow of commercial information is "indis-
pensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise sys-
tem" because it informs the public to make decisions that drive the
economy. 273 A consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial in-
formation may be as intense, if not even more intense, than his inter-
est in that day's urgent political debate. 274
The lesson that can be learned from this decision is that a corpora-
tion may feel free to advertise its product information and compete on
it. Also, if a corporation wanted to disclose truthful and verifiable
policy information it may do so without worrying about incurring
liability.
267. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995).
268. Id. at 478; 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219a (1987).
269. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 479.
270. Id. The Government felt the band was necessary to suppress the threat of "strength
wars" among brewers, who, without the regulation, would seek to compete in the marketplace
based on the potency of their beer. Id.
271. Id. at 485.
272. Id. at 486. Coors argued that Congress actually intended the FAAA to prevent brewers
from making inaccurate claims concerning alcohol content, rather than preventing strength wars.
Id. at 484.
273. Id. at 486.
274. Id. at 481-482 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976)). The Court then applied the Central Hudson test, and rejected the govern-
ment's claim due to a lack of credible evidence that labels would promote strength wars or lead
to alcoholism. Id. at 485 (explaining how the test was applied and how the Court arrived at its
ruling).
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IV. IMPACT
The first and main impact of the California Supreme Court decision
and lack of a decision by the Supreme Court on Nike is that when
Nike tries to defend itself from attacks, it does not have the same First
Amendment protection its critics enjoy.2 7 5 Because Nike competes in
the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace of manufactured goods,
it does not get the same level of protection because its speech is con-
sidered commercial. 276 Since Nike sells athletic products and its de-
fense against critics may help sell those athletic products, the
California Supreme Court asserts that Nike may not freely engage in
the debate or run the risk of lawsuits under California's unfair compe-
tition and false advertising laws should it ever make a factual claim
that turns out to be inaccurate. 277 According to the California Su-
preme Court decision, if Nike utters a factual misstatement, unlike its
critics, it may be sued for restitution, civil penalties, and injunctive
relief under these statutes. 278
The overall impact of the decision is that corporate attorneys will
advise their corporate clients not to speak at all if they are at risk of
being sued every time they may answer a public concern. The result
of this is that the public will be in the dark about corporate practices
and will no longer be able to monitor and criticize business practices.
Corporations, in turn, will not know how to improve or serve their
consumers better because they will only have input from internal
sources that may not be as objective as the general public. Although
there is a general notion of mistrust in our society that makes large
corporations an easy target, the end result will only backfire. Silence
will lead to further abuse and lack of public debate about corporate
practices.
The corporate form has beneficial social purposes for individuals. 279
Viewing corporations from a social and economic perspective, the cor-
porate form serves an important democratic function in "facilitating
the personal self-realization of the individuals who have made the vol-
275. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 264 (Cal. 2002). Judge Chin of the California Supreme
Court was one of the dissenters of the court's opinion. He argued that First and Fourteenth
Amendments "embody our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' Id. at 263 (citing Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)).
276. Id. at 263.
277. Id. at 264.
278. Id. Chin argued that handicapping one side of the debate on important, worldwide issues
as labor standards, is "both ill considered and unconstitutional." Id. at 263.
279. Martin Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate
Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 235 (1998).
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untary choice to make use of it.''280 Also, regardless of the expres-
sions source, corporate speech has the effect of aiding self-realization
of the recipients of that expression.281 The Court in Thornhill stated
that:
[I]n the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution
... Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the
causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective
and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape
the destiny of modem industrial society." 282
Nike's speech, in an attempt to influence public opinion on economic
globalization and international labor rights and working conditions,
gives the public insight and perspective into the debate. 283
Another major consequence of this decision is that based on fear of
being sued, corporations will not inform their shareholders in annual
corporate reports about policy changes, or additions.284 "Fear of large
verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent misstate-
ment, even fear of the expense involved in their defense, must inevita-
bly cause publishers to 'steer wider of the unlawful zone. ' 285 This
concern is not purely theoretical. 286 Nike says without contradiction
that because of this lawsuit it has decided "to restrict severely all of its
communications on social issues that could reach California consum-
ers, including speech in national and international media. '287 It adds
that it has not released its annual Corporate Responsibility Report,
has decided not to pursue a listing in the Dow Jones Sustainability
Index, and has refused "dozens of invitations.., to speak on corpo-
rate responsibility issues. '288
280. Id. at 237. Redish argues that, "[o]ne should view corporate speech, then, as a form of
indirect or catalytic self-realization, no less valuable than the more obvious and direct modes of
self development and thus fully consistent with the purposes served by the constitutional protec-
tion of speech." Id.
281. Id. (arguing that this "obvious fact [is] often mystifyingly ignored by commentators who
wrongly reject constitutional protection for corporate speech"). Id.
282. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 266 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940)).
283. Id. at 267 (arguing that this speech should be fully protected as "essential to free govern-
ment" (citing Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)).
284. Id. at 268. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor joined in dissent, criticized that
the majority decision will result in negative consequences not only for Nike, but also its share-
holders. Id.
285. Id. at 268 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 289 (1964)).
286. Id. The dissent adds these facts to demonstrate the negative consequences of the Califor-
nia and Supreme Court decisions. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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There are several benefits in allowing Nike's speech full protection.
First, in addition to furthering positive values of free expression, re-
gardless of the corporate speaker's motive for the expression, corpo-
rate speech may serve a vital role in checking for potential
governmental abuses.289 Second, regardless of Nike's economic moti-
vation, the public has a right to receive information on matters of pub-
lic concern from both sides of the debate. 290 Freedom of speech
presupposes a willing speaker, and protection is afforded to the com-
munication, its source, and its recipient. 291
Third, Nike's speech is not traditional commercial speech.292 Tradi-
tional commercial speech has been held by the Supreme Court to do
no more than "propose a commercial transaction. ' '293 But in this case,
Nike's speech went beyond that criterion because it provided informa-
tion vital to a public debate on international labor rights and re-
form.294 Its press releases and letters were not pretextual, but
prompted by accusations and public criticism. 295 In the least, this case
illustrates circumstances where commercial speech is inextricably in-
tertwined with noncommercial speech. 296 Nike could not realistically
discuss its general policy on employee rights and working conditions
without referring to the labor practices of its overseas manufacturers,
its products, and how they are made.297 Attempting to separate out
the commercial and noncommercial components of its speech would
be "artificial and impractical. ' 298 Based on the majority's decision
Nike is not the only one that loses - the public does too. 299
289. Redish, supra note 279, at 237. Redish and Wasserman argue that although this role has
traditionally belonged to the media, it is widely recognized today that the media has failed to
perform that function effectively and thus the private corporate sector may perform that govern-
ment checking function due to its built-in incentives of the corporate form. Id.
290. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263 (Cal. 2002).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976)).
294. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
295. Id. at 266 (pointing out that it was noted that Nike did not use any of its product labels,
packaging, advertising, or other media directly to reach its actual or potential consumers. Nike's
speech did not merely include references to public issues. Nike's practices and policies were the
actual public issue. Its "discussion of controversial issues strikes at the heart of the freedom to
speak." Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980)).
296. Id. (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 US 781 (1988)).
297. Id. at 270 (J. Chin argued that Nike's allegedly commercial statements about its labor
practices cannot be separated from its noncommercial statements about a public issue because
its labor practices are the public issue).
298. Id. (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 US 781, 796 (1988)).
299. Id.
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Fourth, with the growth of commercialism, the politicization of
commercial interests, and the increasing sophistication of advertising,
the gap between commercial and noncommercial speech is shrink-
ing.300 The Supreme Court recognized the existence of the political-
economic intersection in Bellotti, when it held that otherwise pro-
tected expression did not lose its protected status just because its
source was a corporation. 30
Another major negative impact of Kasky is the California Supreme
Court's limited purpose test.30 2 First, rather than identifying commer-
cial speech by its content, the limited purpose test distinguishes com-
mercial speech from noncommercial speech by using the identity of
the speaker and the intended audience. 303 The impact of making the
identity of the speaker dispositive is that speech by someone engaged
in commerce that relates to the speaker's business operations, prod-
ucts or services may receive less protection only based on his iden-
tity.3°4 Therefore, the California Court has singled corporate speakers
out and unconstitutionally favors certain speakers over others. 30 5
Under the new test, only corporate speakers are held strictly liable for
false and misleading representations pursuant to the California Unfair
Competition Laws,30 6 while other speakers who make the same repre-
sentations may face no such liability, regardless of the context of their
statements. 30 7
300. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 268. Examples of the intersection between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech includes scientific, political, and religious speech. Id.
301. Redish, supra note 281, at 236 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777 (1978)).
302. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 255.
303. Redish, supra note 279, at 271 (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2000)).
304. Id. (adding that this contravenes the Supreme Court's holding in Pacific Gas where the
Court held that, "[tihe identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is
protected.").
305. Id. at 273 (arguing that the First Amendment does not permit favoritism toward certain
speakers "based on the identity of the interests that [the speaker] may represent." (citing First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
306. Id. (citing CAL. Bus. PROF. CODE §§ 17204, 17535).
307. Id. Charles Wilson, President of General Motors, in 1953 boldly asserted that, "what was
good for our county was good for General Motors, and vice versa." Redish, supra note 279, at
235. He expressed the controversial political and economic theory that does not differentiate
between the interests of the public and private spheres (noting Professor Charles Lindblom
stated that the government and businesses share "the major leadership roles in the politico-
economic order." Charles E. Lindblom, POLITICS AND MARKETS, 179 (1977)). He also recog-
nized the indisputable fact of modern political life, that the health and welfare of the private
corporate world has immeasurable impact on the health and welfare of the government, and vice
versa. Id. at 236. He asked the readers the following questions based on his theory of the indis-
putability of the intersection between governmental and corporate interests:
Who, one could reasonably ask, has a greater interest in what actions the government
takes with regard to the economy than corporations, who very survival may well turn
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Second, the limited purpose-test stifles the ability of speakers en-
gaged in commerce to participate in debates over public issues.308 The
California test renders any public representation of fact by a corpo-
rate speaker about that speaker's products commercial speech. 30 9 A
corporation's product, however, includes the corporation itself.310
Corporations are regularly bought and sold, thus corporations market
not only their products but also themselves. 311 Because all corporate
speech about a public issue reflects on the corporate image and affects
the business goodwill and sale value, the limited purpose test makes
all such speech commercial. 312 By subjecting all corporate speech
about business operations, products, and services to strict liability, the
majority's limited purpose test unconstitutionally chills a corporation's
ability to participate in a debate over matters of public concern. 313
Also, because the corporation could never be sure whether its truthful
statements may deceive or confuse the public, thus incurring signifi-
cant burden and expense in litigating the issue, a lot of valuable infor-
mation that a corporation would otherwise provide will remain
unpublished. 314
on the success or failure of those actions? Who possesses more firsthand knowledge
and expertise on issues relevant to potential government regulation of private eco-
nomic activity? To exclude corporate expression from the scope of free speech protec-
tion would unwisely eliminate from public debate a substantial amount of relevant and
potentially vital information and opinion on issues of great importance to the public.
Id. at 235 (citing excerpts from Two Wilson Hearings Before Senate Committee of De-
fense Appointments, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1953).
In 1953, Wilson was President Eisenhower's nominee to be Secretary of Defense. Id. After
Wilson made that comment, he was subjected to ridicule and criticism in political and intellectual
circles for greedily equating his company's own private economic concerns with those of national
interest. Id.
308. Id. at 243 (arguing that speech on public issues is essential for self government and to
ensure uninhibited debate on public issues, some false or misleading speech must be tolerated).
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
309. Redish, supra note 281, at 272.
310. Id.
311. Id. (adding that business goodwill is an important asset of every corporation and contrib-
utes significantly to the sale value of the corporation).
312. Id. (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 260 (Cal. 2002)).
313. Id. (noting the "chilling effect is exacerbated by the breadth of § 17204 and § 17535,
which prohibit not only false advertising but also advertising which although true, is either actu-
ally misleading or which has the capacity, likelihood, or tendency to deceive or confuse the
public. This broad definition of actionable speech puts a corporation 'at the mercy of the varied
understanding of [its] hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to [its]
intent and meaning.' The judge later suggested that if the government is concerned with protect-
ing consumers from fraud, it can create a narrower false advertising law that could permit the
states to bar all false or misleading advertising about the characteristics of a product or services,
as the product's efficacy, quality, value or safety. This way, corporate speech will not be under-
mined by threat of liability").
314. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 273.
CORPORATE SPEECH
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, until the Supreme Court reviews this
case or a similar case and finally reverses the California Supreme
Court's ruling in Kasky, when advising business clients on how to pub-
licly address issues that the client may consider noncommercial, attor-
neys should notify the client that the safest choice is silence.315 The
"heart of the First Amendment's protection" lies in "the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern . . . Free-
dom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appro-
priate to enable the members of society to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period. '316 Americans, as
consumers or labor critics, have a right to be able to hear information
from as many sources as possible and make choices about who to be-
lieve and what products to buy. Such freedoms may become a thing
of the past if censorship continues. And that is a sad thing.
315. Loeb, supra note 132, at 16.
316. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 101-102). The Thorn-
hill court noted that the exigencies of the colonial period that gave birth to the First Amend-
ment, centered around freedom from oppressive administration of government, but, in the
industrial society of 1940, the same constitutionally protected "area of free discussion" embraced
the dissemination of information about labor disputes. Id. By the same logic, the labor practices
of foreign contractors of domestic companies come within the "exigencies" of our time. Id.
2003]

